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Decades of racial progress have led some researchers and policymakers to doubt that 
discrimination remains an important cause of economic inequality. To study contemporary 
discrimination we conducted a field experiment in the low-wage labor market of New York 
City. The experiment recruited white, black, and Latino job applicants, called testers, who 
were matched on demographic characteristics and interpersonal skills. The testers were 
given equivalent resumes and sent to apply in tandem for hundreds of entry-level jobs. Our 
results show that black applicants were half as likely to receive a callback or job offer relative 
to equally qualified whites. In fact, black and Latino applicants with clean backgrounds fared 
no better than a white applicant just released from prison. Additional qualitative evidence 
from our testers’ experiences further illustrates the multiple points at which employment 
trajectories can be deflected by various forms of racial bias. Together these results point to 
the subtle but systematic forms of discrimination that continue to shape employment 
opportunities for low-wage workers. 
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Despite legal bans on discrimination and the liberalization of racial attitudes since the 1960s, 
racial differences in employment remain among the most enduring forms of economic 
inequality.  Even in the tight labor market of the late 1990s, unemployment rates for black men 
remained twice that for whites.  Racial inequality in total joblessness—including those who 
have exited the labor market—increased among young men during this period (Holzer and 
Offner 2001).  Against this backdrop of persistent racial inequality, the question of 
employment discrimination has generated renewed interest. Though a large research literature 
studies racial inequality in employment, the continuing effects of discrimination remain widely 
contested.   
One line of research points to the persistence of prejudice and discrimination as a 
critical factor shaping contemporary racial disparities (Roscigno et al., 2007; Darity & Mason, 
1998).  A series of studies relying on surveys and in-depth interviews finds that firms are 
reluctant to hire young minority men—especially African Americans—because they are seen 
as unreliable, dishonest, or lacking in social or cognitive skills (Waldinger and Lichter 2003; 
Moss and Tilly 2001; Holzer 1996; Kirschenman & Neckerman, 1991; Wilson 1996, chap. 5).  
The strong negative attitudes expressed by employers suggest that race remains highly salient 
in employers’ evaluations of workers. At the same time, however, research relying on 
interviews with employers leaves uncertain the degree to which self-reported attitudes are 
reflected in actual hiring decisions (Pager & Quillian, 2005).  Indeed, Philip Moss and Chris 
Tilly (2001) report the puzzling finding that “businesses where a plurality of managers 
complained about black motivation are more likely to hire black men” (p.151).  In fact, across 
a series of analyses controlling for firm size, starting wage, the percent black in the relevant 
portion of the metropolitan area, and the business’ average distance from black residents in the   3
area, the authors find that employers who overtly criticize the hard skills or interaction skills of 
black workers are between two and four times more likely to hire a black worker (p.151-152).  
Hiring decisions are influenced by a complex range of factors, racial attitudes being only one.  
The stated preferences of employers, then, leave uncertain the degree to which negative 
attitudes about blacks translate into active forms of discrimination.  
Indeed, other research focusing on wages rather than employment reports even less 
evidence of contemporary discrimination.  Derek Neal and William Johnson (1996), for 
example, estimate wage differences between white, black, and Latino young men.  They find 
that two-thirds of the black-white gap in wages in 1990-1991 can be explained by race 
differences in cognitive test scores measured 11 years earlier; test scores fully explain wage 
differences between whites and Latinos. This and similar studies trace the employment 
problems of young minority men primarily to skill or other individual deficiencies, rather than 
any direct effect of discrimination (Neal and Johnson 1996; Farkas and Vicknair 1996; 
O’Neill, 1990).  Economist James Heckman (1998) puts the point most clearly, writing that 
“most of the disparity in earnings between blacks and whites in the labor market of the 1990s is 
due to differences in skills they bring to the market, and not to discrimination within the labor 
market…” He goes on to describe labor market discrimination as “the problem of an earlier 
era” (Heckman, 1998:101-102).  
Does employer discrimination continue to affect labor market outcomes for minority 
workers?  Clear answers are elusive because discrimination is hard to measure. Without 
observing actual hiring decisions, it is difficult to assess exactly how and under what 
conditions race shapes employer behavior.  We address this issue with a field experiment that 
allows direct observation of employer decision-making.  By presenting equally qualified   4
applicants who differ only by race or ethnicity, we can observe the degree to which racial 
considerations affect real hiring decisions.  Further, we move beyond experimental estimates of 
discrimination to explore the processes by which discrimination occurs.   Examining the 
interactions between job seekers and employers, we gain new insights into how race influences 
employers’ perceptions of job candidate quality and desirability.   Studying the multifaceted 
character of discrimination highlights the range of decisions that collectively reduce 
opportunity for minority candidates.  Together these measures offer a unique view into the 
hiring processes that may contribute to persistent racial inequality in employment.   
 
Conceptualizing Discrimination 
Empirical studies often portray discrimination as a single decision.  Research on employment 
disparities, for example, considers the role of discrimination at the point of initial hire; research 
on wage disparities considers discrimination at the point of wage-setting decisions.  In reality, 
discrimination may occur at multiple decision points across the employment relationship.  In 
this way, even relatively small episodes of discrimination—when experienced at multiple 
intervals or across multiple contexts—can have substantial effects on aggregate outcomes.   
Similarly, depictions of discriminators often portray the labor market as divided neatly 
between those employers with a “taste for discrimination” and those who are indifferent to race 
(Becker, 1957).  In this perspective, job seekers can avoid discrimination by sorting themselves 
into sectors of the labor market in which discrimination is less likely to occur (Heckman, 
1998:103).  Fryer and Levitt (2003) characterize employers according to a similar dichotomy, 
with applicants best advised to identify and avoid employers prone to discrimination rather 
than wasting time pursuing job opportunities among firms unwilling to hire them: “In the face   5
of discriminatory employers, it is actually in the interest of both employee and employers for 
Blacks to signal race, either via a name or other resume information, rather than undertaking a 
costly interview with little hope of receiving a job offer” (Fryer & Levitt, 2003).  According to 
this conceptualization of labor market discrimination, racial preferences or biases are fixed and 
concentrated among a specific subset of employers.  
Other evidence, by contrast, challenges a tidy distinction between employers who do 
and do not discriminate.  Alternative formulations of labor market discrimination encourage us 
to view the process as more often interactive, contextual, and widespread.  Theories of both 
statistical discrimination and stereotypes view race as a heuristic employers use to evaluate job 
applicants about whom little is known. According to this perspective, group-based 
generalizations provide guidance about the expected profile of individuals from a given group 
and can facilitate decision-making when information or time are scarce (Aigner & Cain, 1977; 
Fiske, 1998).  Heuristics of this kind are pervasive (and often unconscious). Their effects may 
vary, however, depending on the availability of and attention to person-specific information 
(such as that conveyed through application materials or in an interview), which may interact 
with and potentially override initial expectations.  A long line of social psychological research 
investigates how stereotypes give way to individualizing information as well as the conditions 
under which stereotypes demonstrate a stubborn resistance to change (Fiske, 1998; 
Bodenhausen, 1988; Trope & Thomson, 1997).
2  This research suggests that salient 
personalizing information can quickly counteract stereotyped expectations; however, in 
evaluating difficult-to-observe or ambiguously relevant characteristics, or when decision-
                                                 
2  Theories of statistical discrimination also predict employer responsiveness to individual characteristics (e.g., 
Altonji & Pierret, 2001; Oettinger, 1996).    6
makers have many competing demands on their attention, stereotypes often work to filter 
information in ways that preserve expectations (Darley & Gross, 1983; Dovidio & Gaertner, 
2000; Biernat, Kobrynowicz, & Weber, 2003).  In these cases of decision-making under 
uncertainty, racial preferences or biases are unlikely to be expressed in any static or uniform 
way, but rather vary in intensity and consequence depending on other characteristics of the 
applicant, the employer, and the interaction between the two.   
In addition to noting the varying role of race across employment interactions, some 
research has shifted the focus from characteristics of the employer to the characteristics of the 
job for which a given worker is being considered.  Previous research has pointed to the 
negative consequences of the changing composition of low-wage jobs for African American 
men, with the shift from manufacturing to service skewing the distribution of skill demands 
toward “soft skills” for which black men are considered lacking (Moss & Tilly, 2001).  Jobs 
involving customer service or contact with clients heighten the salience of race, because of 
employers’ concerns about the dress and demeanor of young black men (Moss & Tilly, 2001).  
Jobs at the “back of the house” or those emphasizing manual skills are less likely to activate 
concerns of this kind.  In this scenario, discrimination may obtain not at the employer level but 
at the job level, with black applicants excluded from some job types and channeled into others.  
In this case, we would look to variation in discrimination not among employers but among the 
job openings for which workers are being considered.   
Rather than viewing discrimination as a single decision, or as the result of a small 
group of highly prejudiced employers, a growing body of research points to the variable 
contexts that shape how information about applicants may be filtered and interpreted along 
racial lines.  Decision-making under uncertainty and the race-typing of jobs both make   7
discrimination more likely. To capture the contingent and cumulative effects of discrimination 
implied by these theories requires examining how experiences of discrimination may be 
distributed across a wide range of decision points, and may vary depending on interactions 
among the employer, the applicant, and the job in question.  
 
The Changing Landscape of Low Wage Labor Markets 
Economic theory predicts the decline of discrimination through market competition (Becker, 
1957), but several features of contemporary low-wage labor markets may sustain or renew 
racialized decision-making.  Shifts in the composition of both low-wage jobs and workers have 
potentially created new incentives and opportunities for employers to enact racial preferences 
in hiring.  First, low-wage job growth has been concentrated in service industries, in positions 
that place a heavy emphasis on self-presentation, interaction with customers, and other 
personality-related attributes (Moss & Tilly, 2001).  As discussed above, employers 
consistently express concerns over the “soft skills” of black men, implying a potential skills 
mismatch between the skill requirements of new job growth and the perceived skill profile of 
black male job seekers.  Further, because many of the qualities valued by employers for 
contemporary low-wage jobs are difficult to evaluate from a written application or brief 
meeting, generalized negative perceptions of minority workers may be more difficult for 
individual minority applicants to disconfirm (Biernat & Kobrynowicz, 1997).   
  Second, low-wage labor markets today are characterized by increasing heterogeneity of 
the urban minority work force, with low-skill African American workers now more likely to 
compete with other minority groups—low-skill Latino workers, in particular. Interviews with 
employers in Los Angeles and Chicago suggest consistent preferences for Latinos over African   8
Americans, with Latino workers viewed as more pliant, reliable, and hard-working (Waldinger 
& Lichter, 2003; Kirschenman & Neckerman, 1991). Given these racial preferences among 
employers, growing competition within the low-wage labor market may leave black men 
vulnerable to discrimination relative not only to whites, but increasingly from Latinos as well.  
Finally, low-wage labor markets are increasingly supplied by workers with criminal 
records. Nearly a third of black noncollege men have prison records by their mid-thirties, 
adding to employers’ reservations about black male job applicants (Pettit & Western, 2004; 
Pager, 2007b).  The high rate of incarceration makes a criminal record a newly important 
source of stigma that is worth studying in its own right. More than this, we can view a criminal 
record as an extreme and authoritative signal of the kinds of problematic behaviors that 
employers ascribe to young black men. In this context, separating the effects of criminal stigma 
from race provides a useful benchmark for measuring racial stigma. In the first effort in this 
direction, Pager’s (2003) research in a Milwaukee field experiment compared racial and 
criminal stigma among matched pairs of job seekers. Fielding a pair of black and a pair of 
white job applicants (in which one member of each pair was randomly assigned a criminal 
record), Pager found that a black applicant with no criminal background experiences job 
prospects similar to those of a white felon.  That blackness confers the same disadvantage as a 
felony conviction helps calibrate the deeply skeptical view of young black men in the eyes of 
Milwaukee employers.  
The growing importance of soft skills, ethnic heterogeneity, and job seekers with 
criminal records suggest the persistence or increasing incidence of discrimination in 
contemporary low-wage labor markets. Whether based on statistical generalizations or 
inaccurate stereotypes, preconceived notions about the characteristics or desirability of black   9
men relative to other applicant types will likely structure the distribution of opportunity in 
contemporary low-wage labor markets along racial lines.  
 
Methods for Studying Labor Market Discrimination 
Racial discrimination in the labor market is typically studied by comparing the wages of whites 
and minorities, statistically controlling for human capital characteristics. Estimates from a 
variety of social surveys suggest that the black-white difference in hourly wages among men 
usually range between about 10 and 20 percent (e.g., Cancio et al 1996; Neal and Johnson 
1996; Darity and Meyers 1998). Though widely used, this residual method, in which 
discrimination is defined as the unexplained race difference in wages, is sensitive to the 
measurement of human capital. Where race differences in human capital are incompletely 
observed, the effect of discrimination may be over-estimated (e.g., Neal and Johnson 1996; 
Farkas and Vicknair 1996).   
Residual estimates of discrimination infer employer behavior from data on workers’ 
wages. Field experiments, by contrast, offer a more direct approach to the measurement of 
discrimination.  This approach, also referred to as an audit methodology, involves the use of 
matched teams of job applicants—called testers—who apply to real job openings and record 
responses from employers. In studies of racial discrimination, black and white testers are 
assigned equivalent resumes and are matched on a variety of characteristics like age, education, 
physical appearance, and interpersonal skills. Because black and white testers are sent to the 
same firms, and testers are matched on a wide variety of characteristics, much of the 
unexplained variation that confounds residual estimates of discrimination is experimentally 
controlled.     10
In part because of taxing logistical requirements, the use of in-person audit studies of 
employment remains rare, with only a handful of such studies conducted over the past 20 years 
(Cross et al. 1990; Turner et al. 1991; Bendick et al., 1991; Bendick et al. 1994; Pager, 2003).
3  
Moreover, the typical emphasis on a single comparison group leaves several significant 
features of contemporary urban labor markets unexplored.  
By studying both race and criminal background, the Milwaukee audit study represents 
an important starting point for this project (Pager 2003). The Milwaukee study focused on the 
influence of the criminal justice system on labor market stratification by studying the effect of 
a criminal record for black and white job seekers.  Though race emerged as a key theme in the 
study’s findings, the topic of racial discrimination was not a central focus. Moreover, the 
research design yielded only indirect evidence of racial discrimination because black and white 
testers did not apply to the same employers.  Our ability to investigate when and how racial 
discrimination occurs, therefore, is limited in this context.  
The current study updates and extends earlier research in several ways. First, we focus 
directly on the question of racial discrimination, both in conceptualization and design.  This 
emphasis allows us to situate our research within ongoing debates about discrimination, and to 
provide a rigorous design for detecting racial discrimination.  Second, we move beyond 
standard two-race models of discrimination by including matched black, white, and Latino job 
seekers, reflecting the racial heterogeneity of large urban labor markets. To our knowledge, 
this is the first study of its kind to simultaneously examine the employment experiences of 
three racial/ethnic groups.  Third, to help calibrate the magnitude of racial preferences, we 
                                                 
3 For a summary of the results of earlier audit studies, see Heckman and Siegelman (1993) and Pager (2007a).  
Less costly are correspondence studies, which rely on resumes sent by mail rather than in-person applications.  In-
person audit studies have been used more often for investigations of housing discrimination, in which the 
requirements of matching and supervision are less stringent than in the employment context (e.g., Yinger, 1995).     11
compare applicants affected by varying forms of stigma; specifically, we compare minority 
applicants to white applicants just released from prison.  Where the Milwaukee study 
attempted this comparison across teams, the present analysis provides a direct test by 
comparing the outcomes of minority and ex-offender applicants who visited the same 
employers.  Finally, we extend our analysis from the quantitative evidence of differential 
treatment to a rich set of qualitative data allowing for an exploration of the process of 
discrimination.  Drawing from the extensive field notes taken by testers which describe their 
interactions with employers, we provide a unique window into the range of employer responses 
that characterize discrimination in contemporary low-wage labor markets. 
 
Research Design and Methods 
The New York City Hiring Discrimination Study sent matched teams of testers to apply for 
341 real entry-level jobs throughout New York City over nine months in 2004. The testers 
were well-spoken, clean-cut young men, aged 22 to 26. Most were college-educated, between 5 
feet 10 inches and 6 feet in height, recruited in and around New York City. They were matched 
on the basis of their verbal skills, interactional styles (level of eye-contact, demeanor, and 
verbosity), and physical attractiveness. Testers were assigned fictitious resumes indicating 
identical educational attainment, and comparable quality of high school, work experience 
(quantity and kind), and neighborhood of residence. Resumes were prepared in different fonts 
and formats and randomly varied across testers, with each resume used by testers from each 
race group. Testers presented themselves as high school graduates with steady work experience 
in entry-level jobs. Finally, the testers passed through a common training program to ensure   12
uniform behavior in job interviews. While in the field, the testers dressed similarly and 
communicated with teammates by cell phone to anticipate unusual interview situations.  
We fielded two teams, with each team including a white, Latino, and black tester. To 
help ensure comparability, the Latino testers spoke in unaccented English, were U.S. citizens 
of Puerto Rican descent, and like the other testers, claimed no Spanish language ability. The 
first team tests a standard racial hierarchy, with the white tester serving as a benchmark against 
which to measure variation in racial and ethnic discrimination.  To calibrate the magnitude of 
racial stigma, the second team compares black and Latino testers to a white tester with a 
criminal record. The criminal record was typically disclosed in answer to the standard question 
on employment applications, “Have you ever been convicted of a crime? If yes, please 
explain.”  When asked, testers were instructed to reveal that they had recently been released 
from prison after serving 18 months for a drug felony (possession with intent to distribute, 
cocaine).  In addition, following Pager (2003), the white tester’s criminal record was also 
signaled on the resume by listing work experience at a state prison, and by listing a parole 
officer as a reference.
4  
For both teams, employers were sampled from job listings for entry-level positions, 
defined as jobs requiring little previous experience and no more than a high school degree.  Job 
titles included restaurant jobs, retail sales, warehouse workers, couriers, telemarketers, 
customer service positions, clerical workers, stockers, movers, delivery drivers, and a wide 
range of other low-wage positions.  Job listings were randomly drawn each week from the 
classified sections of The New York Times, The Daily News, The New York Post, The Village 
                                                 
4  Results from Pager (2003) suggest that providing information about a criminal record to employers who do not 
request the information does little to affect hiring decisions.     13
Voice, and the online service, Craigslist. The broad range of job listings allows for extensive 
coverage of the entry-level labor market in New York. From the available population of job 
listings, we took a simple random sample of advertisements each week. Testers in each team 
applied to each job within a 24-hour period, randomly varying the order of the applicants.  
  Our dependent variable recorded any positive response in which a tester was either 
offered a job or called back for a second interview. Callbacks were recorded by voicemail 
boxes set up for each tester. For employer i (i=1,…,N) and tester t (t=W, B, or L for white, 
black, or Latino), a positive response, yit, is a binary variable that scores 1 for a job offer or 
callback, and 0 otherwise. We define the level of differential treatment as the ratio in positive 
response rates for each comparison, 
B W WB y y r / = , where  t y  is the proportion of positive 
responses for testers of race t. Under the null hypothesis of equal treatment, rWB=1, the 
proportion of positive responses received by each racial group is equal. For data on matched 
pairs, several statistical tests have been proposed that use within-pair comparisons to account 
for the correlation of observations from the same pair (e.g., Heckman and Seigelman 1993; 
Agresti 1990). In our case, where three testers are sent to the same employer, we have a 
matched triplet and information from all three testers should ideally contribute to an inference 
about a contrast between any two. Ghosh, Chen, Ghosh and Agresti (2000) suggest that 
matched pairs can be fit with a hierarchical logistic regression with a random effect for each 
pair.  We generalize their approach to our matched triplets, fitting a random effect for each 
employer. If the probability of a positive response is given by E(yit)=pit, the hierarchical model 
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where Bit is a dummy variable for blacks, Lit is a dummy variable for Latinos, and the random 
effects for employers, αi, is given a normal distribution. The employer effects, αi, induce a 
correlation among observations from the same employers and reduce standard errors as in the 
usual matched-pair inference. The models are estimated with Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
methods. Intervals for the ratios (rWB, rWL, and rBL) are constructed by taking random draws 
from the posterior predictive distribution of yit. Alternative methods that adjust for clustering 
by employer yield similar results to those reported below.  
 
The Problems of Matching  
The quality of audit results depends on the comparability of the testers. Because race cannot be 
experimentally assigned, researchers must rely on effective selection and matching to construct 
audit teams in which all relevant characteristics of testers are similar—something that may 
leave substantial room for bias.  Heckman and Seigelman (1993) have argued that researchers 
know little about the hard-to-observe characteristics highly prized by employers.  If testers are 
poorly matched, evidence of discrimination may be merely an artifact of idiosyncratic tester 
characteristics.  
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) remove tester effects in a “correspondence test” 
which sent resumes with common white and African American names to employers in Boston 
and Chicago. Their design allows the random assignment of resume characteristics to white- 
and black-sounding names, largely removing concerns about unobserved characteristics. 
Resumes with white names were 50 percent more likely to receive callbacks from employers 
than those with black names (9.7 vs 6.5 percent).  Studies of this kind provide some 
reassurance that results from the body of audit research are not driven by tester effects alone.    15
Because we rely on in-person audits for our study of low-wage labor markets, the 
effective matching of testers becomes a key concern.
5  We reviewed over 300 applicants to 
identify our final team of 10 testers.
6  Successful applicants were subject to two lengthy 
screening interviews and a written test, a far more probing job selection process than the testers 
encountered in their fieldwork.
7 Each tester passed through a standard training period, was 
required to dress uniformly, and was subject to periodic spot checks for quality control.
8  
Despite these measures, uncontrolled tester effects remain a threat to inferences about 
discrimination. We assess the sensitivity of our results to testers in four ways. First, each tester 
may have a unique effect, but the average effect of the testers may be zero. In this case, the 
observations from each tester will be correlated and standard errors that ignore this clustering 
will tend to be too small. We allow for this possibility by fitting an additional random effect for 
each tester in our hierarchical logistic regression.
9  Second, each tester may have a unique 
effect, but these effects may not average to zero. To assess the sensitivity of our results to each 
tester we perform a type of cross-validation in which the treatment effect is recalculated for a 
reduced data set, sequentially omitting those employers associated with each individual tester. 
                                                 
5  In-person audits allow for the inclusion of a wide range of entry-level job types (which often require in-person 
applications); they provide a clear method for signaling race, without concerns over the class-connotations of 
racially distinctive names (e.g., Fryer & Levitt, 2004); and they provide the opportunity to gather both quantitative 
and qualitative data, with information on whether or not the applicant receives the job as well as how he is treated 
during the interview process.   
6  These 300 applicants had already been pre-screened for appropriate age, race, ethnicity, and gender.  
7  Indeed, as an employer him/herself, the researcher must identify subtle cues about applicants that indicate their 
ability to perform.  Whether or not these cues are explicit, conscious, or measurable, they are present in a 
researcher’s evaluation of tester candidates as they are for employers’ evaluations of entry-level job applicants.  
Like employers, researchers are affected by both objective and subjective/subconscious indicators of applicant 
quality in their selection and matching of testers in ways that should ultimately improve the nuanced calibration of 
test partners. 
8  On several occasions we “tested the testers,” for example by hiding a video cameras in the offices of 
confederate employers, allowing us to monitor testers’ compliance with the audit protocol and for use as a training 
tool to better synchronize the performance of test partners (not counted among results).   
9  Additional models (not shown here) test for fixed effects of several individual testers, finding no significant 
differences across testers within each race group.    16
Confidence intervals below are based on models including employer and tester random effects. 
These results are compared to cross-validation treatment effects based on subsets of the data in 
which individual testers are sequentially omitted.  Third, we recalculate our key results for 
each unique combination of testers matched in teams over the course of the fieldwork 
(Appendix B).  These results, though sensitive to small sample sizes for some combinations, 
tend to support the consistency of effects across a number of tester comparisons.   
As a final investigation of tester effects, we consider the possibility that the 
expectations or behaviors of testers may influence the audit results in nonrandom ways. For 
example, if a black tester expects to be treated poorly by employers, he may appear more 
withdrawn, nervous, or defensive in interactions.  The nature of the interaction may then create 
a self-fulfilling prophecy, in which the tester experiences poor outcomes, but for reasons 
unrelated to his race (Steele & Aronsen, 1995).  We can assess these tester effects by analyzing 
the degree to which personal contact between testers and employers is associated with 
widening racial disparities. Overall we find no evidence that testers’ interpersonal style or 
expectations are associated with increasing discrimination; if anything, personal contact 
appears to weaken the effect of race, suggesting that the performance of the testers worked to 
minimize rather than exaggerate our measures of racial bias (See Appendix A).    
The problem of imperfect matching among testers is a well-understood vulnerability of 
audit experiments, and one to which we devoted considerable attention.  Ironically, however, 
the achievement of perfect matches can itself produce distortions in the hiring process.  
Because audit partners are matched on all characteristics that are most directly relevant to 
hiring decisions (e.g., education, work experience, physical appearance, etc.), employers may 
be forced to privilege relatively minor characteristics simply out of necessity of breaking the   17
tie (Heckman, 1998: 111).  If employers care only marginally about race, but are confronted 
with applicants equal on all other dimensions, this single characteristic may take on greater 
significance in that particular hiring decision than is true under normal circumstances when 
evaluating real applicants who differ according to multiple dimensions.   
The design of our study, which focuses on the early stages of the hiring process, avoids 
situations in which employers must choose only a single applicant.  By using “callbacks” as 
one of our key dependent variables, we include cases which represent an employer’s first pass 
at applicant screening.
10  Indeed, employers typically interview an average of eight applicants 
for each entry-level job they fill (see Pager, 2007).  If race represents only a minor concern for 
employers, we would expect all members of our audit team to make it through the first cut.  If 
race figures prominently even in the first round of review, we can infer that this characteristic 
has been invoked as more than a mere tie-breaker.  In these cases, the evidence of race-based 
decision-making is quite strong.  
 
Experimental Results 
The primary results from the audit study focus on the proportion of applications submitted by 
testers which elicited either a callback or job offer from employers, by race of the applicant.  
Our first team assesses the effects of race discrimination by comparing the outcomes of equally 
qualified white, Latino, and black applicants. Positive response rates for each race-ethnicity 
group are reported in Figure 1a. In applications to 171 employers, the white tester received a 
callback or job offer 31.0 percent of the time, compared to a positive response rate of 25.2 
                                                 
10  Positive responses recorded in this study were fairly evenly split among callbacks and job offers. Employers 
who made offers on-the-spot were typically those hiring more than one applicant, thus similarly avoiding a 
situation in which a forced-choice becomes necessary. In fact, rates of job offers were more evenly distributed by 
race relative to callbacks (see Tables A1 and A2).       18
percent for Latinos and 15.2 percent for blacks.  These results show a clear racial hierarchy, 





















Note: Hollow circles in Figure 1b indicate point estimates of the ratio.  Solid circles indicate ratios obtained by 
sequentially dropping testers from the analysis.  95% confidence intervals were estimated from a logistic 
hierarchical regression with employer and tester random effects.  Number of employers = 171. 
 
 
Figure 1.b shows the contrasts between the three race groups. Once we adjust for employer and 
tester effects, the confidence interval for the white-Latino ratio of 1.23 includes one.
11  By 
contrast, the white-black ratio of 2.04 is substantively large and statistically significant. The 
positive response rate for blacks is also significantly lower than the rate for Latinos. The points 
on the figure show the cross-validation results obtained by sequentially dropping audits 
associated with each individual tester. In each case, all ratios remain consistently greater than 
                                                 
11  Note that in a model pooling the audits from the two teams, with main effects for team and criminal 
background, the white-Latino gap becomes statistically significant.  The generality of this result certainly deserves 
more study. The Puerto Ricans of New York that our Latino testers represented are a longstanding community of 
U.S. citizens. In other local labor markets where markers of citizenship and accent are more prominent sources of 
difference, evidence of ethnic discrimination may well be stronger. 
























































one, indicating that employers treat blacks less positively regardless of which testers are 
applying for jobs. Overall, these results indicate that white and Latino job applicants are 
significantly preferred by employers relative to equally qualified blacks. The findings suggest 
that a black applicant would have to search twice as long as an equally qualified white 
applicant before receiving a callback or job offer from an employer.  
The results from this first comparison indicate the strong racial preferences of 
employers; but the magnitude of this preference remains somewhat abstract.  To calibrate the 
effects of race against another stigmatized category, the ex-offender, we repeated the 
experiment, this time assigning a criminal record to the white tester. Figure 2 shows the 
percentage of positive responses—job offers or callbacks—received by each tester.  In this 
experiment, whites with criminal records obtained positive responses in 17.2 percent of 169 job 
applications, compared to 15.4 for Latinos, and 13.0 percent for blacks.
12  The racial advantage 
experienced by white testers narrows substantially in this comparison, and yet still the white 
applicant with a criminal record does just as well if not better than his minority counterparts 













                                                 
12  Note that the overall rate of positive responses is lower for all testers relative to the results presented in Figure 
1. This is likely due to the staggered fielding of teams and resulting differences in the composition of employers 





















Note: Hollow circles in Figure 2b indicate point estimates of the ratio.  Solid circles indicate ratios obtained by 
sequentially dropping testers from the analysis.  95% confidence intervals were estimated from a logistic 
hierarchical regression with employer and tester random effects.  Number of employers = 169. 
 
 
Figure 2b shows that the white-Latino ratio is close to one and the confidence interval overlaps 
one by a large margin. The white-black ratio is now a statistically insignificant 1.32, compared 
to a significant ratio of 2.04 when the white tester had a clean record. As in the previous 
experiment, Latinos were preferred to blacks, but in this case the difference is not significant.  
As before, the cross-validation treatment effects, obtained by dropping employers associated 
with one particular tester, are all close to one. These results indicate that, regardless of which 
testers were sent into the field, employers differentiated little among the three applicant groups. 
The comparison of a white felon to black and Latino applicants with clean backgrounds 
provides a vivid calibration of the effects of race on hiring decisions.  While ex-offenders are 
disadvantaged in the labor market relative to applicants with no criminal background, the 
stigma of a felony conviction appears no greater than that of minority status.  According to 
Figure 2b. Ratios of positive responses by 



















Figure 2a. Positive responses by race, 




































these results, New York employers view minority applicants as essentially equivalent to whites 
just out of prison.   
Theories of statistical discrimination point to the very high incarceration rates among 
young black men as a key explanation for employers’ indifference between white felons and 
blacks with potentially unobserved criminal histories.  Current estimates suggest that roughly 
18 percent of young black men with high school degrees will experience incarceration by their 
early 30s (Pettit & Western, 2004), and a larger fraction are surely affected by lower level 
convictions and arrests.  Still, that known information about a serious criminal conviction 
among a white applicant is viewed with no more concern than the assumed characteristics of a 
young black man points to the strength and intensity of contemporary racial attitudes. 
Overcoming these negative expectations, even for a candidate with otherwise appealing 
characteristics, requires the negotiation of a number of significant hurdles not present for white 
job seekers.  In the following section, we examine the specific types of hurdles encountered by 
our minority testers in their search for low-wage work.    
 
 
Race at Work: An Examination of Interactions between Applicants and Employers 
The strong evidence of hiring discrimination from the field experiment provides a clear 
measure of the continuing significance of race in employer decision-making.  These numbers, 
however, tell us little about the process by which race comes to matter.  Fortunately, the in-
person design of the experiment allows us to further supplement the experimental findings with 
qualitative evidence from testers’ field notes reporting their interactions in job interviews. 
These detailed narratives directly report on employers’ deliberations and help to suggest when 
and how race comes into play.     22
This analysis examines cases in which testers had sufficient interaction with employers 
for content coding.  Consistent with the notion that contemporary forms of discrimination are 
largely subtle and covert, many cases contained little that would lead us to anticipate the 
differential treatment that followed.  Of those that do, however, we observe several consistent 
patterns in employers’ responses.  In particular, three categories of behavior stand out and are 
examined in detail below: categorical exclusion, shifting standards, and race-coded job 
channeling.  The first type of behavior, categorical exclusion, is characterized by an immediate 
or automatic rejection of the black (or minority) candidate(s) in favor of the white applicant.  
Occurring early in the application process, these decisions involve little negotiated interaction, 
but rather appear to reflect a fairly rigid application of the employers’ racial preferences or 
beliefs.  A second category of behavior, shifting standards, reflects a more dynamic process of 
decision-making.  Here we observe cases in which employers’ evaluations of applicants appear 
actively shaped or constructed through a racial lens, with similar qualifications or deficits 
taking on varying relevance depending on the race of their bearer.  Finally, a third category of 
behavior moves beyond the hiring decision to a focus on job placement.  Race-based job 
channeling represents a process by which minority applicants are steered toward particular job 
types, often those characterized by greater physical demands and reduced customer contact.  
By observing the interactions that characterize each of these behavior types, we directly 
view the processes by which discrimination takes place.  At the same time, we emphasize that 
this discussion is intended as a descriptive exercise rather than a formal causal analysis.  
Indeed, the categories we identify are not mutually exclusive; some of the same processes may 
be operating simultaneously, with employers’ shifting evaluations of applicant skills leading to 
differential patterns of job channeling, or assumptions about the appropriate race of the   23
incumbent of a particular position leading to forms of categorical exclusion.  Likewise, we note 
that this typology cannot account for all of the differential treatment we observe—indeed, at 
least half such cases were made on the basis of little or no personal contact between applicant 
and employer, leaving the nature of the decision entirely unobserved.  With these caveats in 
mind, we nevertheless view the analysis as providing a unique contribution to the study of 
racial discrimination, revealing mechanisms at work that observational research can rarely 
identify.   
 
Categorical Exclusion   
Few interactions between our testers and employers revealed signs of racial animus or hostility 
toward minority applicants.  At the same time, a close comparison of test partners’ experiences 
show a number of cases in which race appears to be the sole or primary criterion for an 
employer’s decision.  With little negotiation or deliberation over the selection decision, these 
employers’ decisions seem to reflect a preexisting judgment regarding the adequacy or 
desirability of a minority candidate.  The uncompromising nature of the employer’s decision 
can be characterized as a form of categorical exclusion.   
A clearcut case of categorical exclusion was provided when all three testers were 
present for an interview and received a perfunctory decision. Zuri, an African American tester, 
reports his experience applying for the warehouse worker position: “The original woman who 
had herded us in told us that when we finished filling out the application we could leave 
because “there’s no interview today, guys!”…When I made it across the street to the bus stop 
…the woman who had collected our completed applications pointed in the direction of Simon, 
Josue and myself [the three test partners] motioning for us to return.  All three of us went   24
over….  She looked at me and told me she “needed to speak to these two” and that I could go 
back.”  Zuri returned to the bus stop, while his white and Latino test partners were both asked 
to come back at 5pm that day to start work.  Simon, the white tester, reports, “She said she told 
the other people that we needed to sign something—that that’s why she called us over—so as 
not to let them know she was hiring us.  She seemed pretty concerned with not letting anyone 
else know.”   
In this context, with no interview and virtually no direct contact with the employer, we 
observe a decision that appears based on little other than race. The job is a manual position for 
which Zuri is at least as able, and yet he is readily passed over in favor of his white and Latino 
counterparts.   
This case is unusual in that the three testers were rarely present at a given location at 
the same time. More often, evidence of differential treatment was found only after comparing 
the testers’ reports side by side.  But here too we observed several hiring decisions in which 
race appeared to be the sole or primary source of differentiation. In one case, for example, the 
three testers inquired about a sales position at a retail clothing store. Joe, one of our African 
American testers, reports: “[The employer] said the position was just filled and that she would 
be calling people in for an interview if the person doesn’t work out.”  Josue, his Latino test 
partner, was told something very similar:  “She informed me that the position was already 
filled, but did not know if the hired employee would work out.  She told me to leave my resume 
with her.”  By contrast, when Simon, their white test partner, applied last, his experience is 
notably different: “…I asked what the hiring process was—if they’re taking applications now, 
interviewing, etc.  She looked at my application.  ‘You can start immediately?’  Yes.  ‘Can you   25
start tomorrow?’  Yes.  ‘10 a.m.’  She was very friendly and introduced me to another woman 
(white, 28) at the cash register who will be training me.” 
A similar case arose a few weeks later at an electronics store.  Joe, the African 
American tester, was allowed to complete an application but was told that his references would 
have to be checked before he could be interviewed. Meanwhile, Simon and Josue, his white 
and Latino partners, applied shortly thereafter and were interviewed on the spot. Joe’s 
references were never called, while Simon received a callback two days later offering him the 
job.   
  When evaluated individually, these interactions did not indicate racial prejudice or 
discrimination.  And yet, side by side, we see minority applicants encounter barriers not 
present for the white applicant, with employers citing excuses for putting off the black or 
minority candidate (e.g., “the job has already been filled”; or “we’d have to check your 
references before we can proceed”), which in the white applicant’s case appear not to apply.  
To be sure, certain cases may capture random error—perhaps the position became available 
between the testers’ visits, leading to the employer’s differential response.  Still, the 
consistency of the pattern in these data suggest that random error is unlikely to be a dominant 
factor.  Indeed, of the 171 tests conducted by the first team (no criminal background), white 
testers were singled out for callbacks or job offers 15 times, whereas there was only a single 
case in which a black tester received a positive response when his white or Latino partner did 
not.
13   
                                                 
13  There were an additional 13 cases in which both white and Latino testers received positive responses, and 7 in 
which the Latino tester alone was selected (see Appendix B)..[I delete this sentence because the quantitative 
section makes this same point]    26
  These cases of categorical exclusion, though directly observed in just a small number of 
the audits (5 of the 47 cases of differential treatment across the two teams), reveal one form of 
discrimination in which racial considerations appear relatively fixed and unyielding.  Before 
black (or minority) candidates have the chance to demonstrate their qualifications, they are 
weeded out on the basis of a single categorical distinction.
14   
Categorical exclusion represents one important form of discrimination.  These rather 
abrupt interactions reveal little about the underlying motivation that drives employers’ 
decisions, but demonstrate the sometimes rigid barriers facing minority job seekers.  In these 
cases, black/minority applicants are discouraged or dismissed at the outset of the employment 
process, leaving little opportunity for a more nuanced review.    
 
Shifting Standards 
Making it past the initial point of contact was not the only hurdle facing minority applicants. 
Indeed, among those who recorded more extensive interaction with employers, we observe a 
complex set of racial dynamics at work.  On the one hand, personal contact with employers 
was associated with significantly improved outcomes for all testers and a narrowing of the 
racial gap (see Appendix A).  The interpersonal skills of the testers seemed to reduce the 
influence of racial bias, or at very least not to exacerbate it.  And yet, even in the context of this 
more personalized review, we see evidence of subtle bias in the evaluation of applicant 
qualifications.  In particular, a number of cases reveal how the “objective” qualifications of 
                                                 
14 The denominator represents the total number of cases of black-white differential treatment from the first (n=28) 
and second (n=19) teams. In calculating the numerator, a number of additional cases of differential treatment at 
the initial stage of review are not included here.  At least half of the tests were completed with very little or no 
contact with the employer (with similar rates of contact by race).  In such cases, differential treatment may reflect 
categorical exclusion (based on a visual assessment of the candidate), shifting standards (based on a review of the 
completed applications), random error, or something else.    27
testers appear to be re-interpreted through the lens of race.  Though testers’ resumes were 
matched on education and work experience, employers at times appeared to weigh 
qualifications differently depending on the race of the applicant.  In the following interactions, 
we see evidence that the same deficiencies of skill or experience appear to be more 
disqualifying for the minority job seekers (n=11).   
In one case, Joe, an African American tester, was not allowed to apply for a sales 
position as a result of his lacking direct experience. He reports: “When [the employer] called 
me she handed me back my resume and told me they didn’t have any positions to offer 
me…She said… I needed a couple years of experience.” The employer voices similar concerns 
with Kevin, Joe’s white partner. Kevin writes: “[The employer] looked at my resume and said, 
‘There is absolutely nothing here that qualifies you for this position.’”  And yet, despite his 
clear lack of qualifications, Kevin was then offered the sales job and asked to come back the 
next morning.  In interactions with both testers the employer clearly expresses his concern over 
the applicants’ lack of relevant work experience.  In the case of the white applicant, however, 
this the lack of experience does not end up representing grounds for disqualification, whereas 
the black applicant is readily dismissed.  
In another case, Josue, a Latino tester, applied for a job as a line cook at a mid-level 
Manhattan restaurant. He reports: “[The employer] then asked me if I had any prior kitchen or 
cooking experience. I told him that I did not really have any, but that I worked alongside cooks 
at [my prior job as a server]. He then asked me if I had any ‘knife’ experience and I told him 
no… He told me he would give me a try and wanted to know if I was available this coming 
Sunday at 2 p.m.” Simon, his white test partner, was also invited to come back for a trial 
period.  By contrast, Joe, the black tester found, “they are only looking for experienced line   28
cooks.” Joe continued, “I started to try and convince him to give me a chance but he cut me off 
and said I didn’t qualify.” Though none of the testers had direct experience with kitchen work, 
the white and Latino applicants were viewed as viable prospects, while the black applicant was 
rejected because he lacked experience.  
In other cases, real skill or experience differences were perceived among applicants 
despite the fact that the testers’ resumes were designed to convey identical qualifications.  In 
one case, for example, the testers applied for a job at a moving company. Joe, the African 
American applicant, spoke with the employer about his prior experience at a delivery company. 
Nevertheless, “[the employer] told me that he couldn’t use me because he is looking for 
someone with moving experience.” Josue, his Latino partner, presented his experience as a 
stocker at a delivery company and reports a similar reaction: “He then told me that since I have 
no experience... there is nothing he could do for me.” Simon, their white test partner, presented 
his identical qualifications to which the employer responds more favorably: “‘To be honest, 
we’re looking for someone with specific moving experience. But because you’ve worked for [a 
storage company], that has a little to do with moving.’  He wanted me to come in tomorrow 
between 10 and 11 for an interview.”  The employer is consistent in his preference for workers 
with relevant prior experience, but he is willing to apply a more flexible, inclusive standard in 
evaluating the experience of the white applicant than in the case of the minority applicants.  
The shifting standards used by employers, offering more latitude to marginally skilled white 
applicants than similarly qualified minorities, suggests that even the evaluation of “objective” 
information can be affected by underlying racial considerations.  
Even in cases where the white tester presented himself as a felon, we see some 
evidence that this applicant was afforded the benefit of the doubt in ways that his minority   29
counterparts were not.  In applying at an auto dealership, for example, the three testers were 
met with very different reactions. Joe, the black tester, was informed at the outset that the only 
available positions were for those with direct auto sales experience.  When Josue, his Latino 
partner, applied, the lack of direct auto sales experience was less of a problem.  Josue reports:  
“He asked me if I had any customer service experience and I said not really…. He then told me 
that he wanted to get rid of a few bad apples who were not performing well.  He asked me 
when I could start….”  Josue was told to wait for a call back on Monday.  When the employer 
interviewed Keith, their white ex-felon test partner, he was first given a stern lecture regarding 
his criminal background. The employer warned, “I have no problem with your conviction, it 
doesn’t bother me.  But if I find out money is missing or you’re not clean or not showing up on 
time I have no problem ending the relationship.”  And yet, despite the employer’s concerns, 
Keith was offered the job on the spot.  The benefit of the doubt conferred by whiteness persists 
here even in the context of a white applicant just released from prison.  Reservations about 
relevant work experience and concerns over possible problem behaviors associated with a 
criminal background are set aside as the employer selects the white felon applicant but not the 
similarly qualified black or Latino applicants with no criminal background.  
A pattern in these interactions, when compared side by side, is the use of double 
standards—seeking higher qualifications from blacks than non-blacks, or viewing whites as 
more qualified than minorities presenting equivalent resumes. Recent research emphasizes 
employers’ use of race as a proxy for difficult-to-observe productivity characteristics (Moss 
and Tilly 2001; Waldinger and Lichter 2003). Where we have detailed field notes on job 
interviews, the interactions we observe suggest that employers also use race in interpreting and 
weighting observable skill characteristics.   Standards appeared to shift as employers evaluated   30
the qualifications of various applicants differently depending on their race or ethnicity (see also 
Biernat and Kobrynowicz, 1997; Yarkin et al., 1982).   
 
Race Coded Job Channeling 
The first two categories of differential treatment focus on the decision to hire.  Beyond this 
binary decision, employers also face decisions about where to place a worker within the 
organizational hierarchy.  Here, at the point of job placement, we observe a third category of 
differential treatment.  In our review of the testers’ experiences, we noticed that applicants 
were at times encouraged to apply for jobs different than the ones initially advertised or the 
ones about which they had inquired.  In many cases, these instances of channeling suggest a 
race-coding of job types, whereby employers prefer whites for certain positions and minorities 
for others.  For example, in one case, Zuri, a black tester, applied for a sales position at a 
lighting store.  A sign on the glass in front of the store indicated, “Salesperson Wanted.”  Zuri 
describes the following interaction:  “When she asked what position I was looking for I said I 
was open, but that since they were looking for a salesperson I would be interested in that.  She 
smiled, put her head in her hand and her elbow on the table and said, ‘I need a stock boy. Can 
you do stock boy?’”  Zuri’s white and Latino test partners, by contrast, were each able to apply 
for the advertised sales position.   
  Another African American tester, Joe, was similarly channeled out of a customer 
service position in his application to a Japanese restaurant.  Joe reports: “I told her I was there 
to apply for the waiter position and she told me that there were no server positions.  I told her 
it was advertised in the paper, and she said there must have been a mistake.  She said all she 
had available was a busboy position.  I told her since there was no waiter position, I would   31
apply for the busboy.”  Meanwhile later that day, Kevin, his white test partner, was hired for 
the server position on the spot.   
  We also observed channeling of the Latino testers. Josue’s fieldnotes of an audit at a 
clothing retailer begins by describing the “young white 20-something women running the 
place.” One of the women interviews him and asks about past work experience. She asks him 
what job he’s applying for—“I told her ‘sales associate,’” Josue replied, presenting a resume 
on which the most recent job listed was as a sales assistant at a sporting goods store. “She then 
told me that there was a stock position and asked if I would be interested in that.” Josue ended 
up getting the stocker job, and was asked to start the next day.  
In many cases, these instances of channeling are coded as “positive responses” in the 
initial analyses.  Indeed, our key concern is about access to employment of any kind.  But this 
general focus masks another form of the racial bias at work.  A closer analysis of the testers’ 
experiences suggests that decisions about job placement, like hiring more generally, often 
follow a racial logic.  We coded all instances of job channeling across both our teams and 
counted 53 cases (compared to 172 positive responses). By comparing the original job title to 
the suggested job type, these cases were then categorized as downward channeling, upward 
channeling, lateral channeling, or unknown. Downward channeling is defined as (1) a move 
from a job involving contact with customers to a job without, say from server to busboy; (2) a 
move from a white collar position to a manual position, say from sales to stocker; or (3) a 
move in which hierarchy is clear, say from supervisor to line worker. Upward channeling is 
defined as a move in the opposite direction. We focus on these two types of channeling for our 
current analysis. After eliminating cases in which all testers within a team were similarly   32
channeled, we have 23 additional cases of differential treatment unrecorded by our initial 
measurement of job offers and callbacks.  
Like hiring criteria, job placement is also patterned by race (see Table 1). Black 
applicants were channeled into lower positions in 9 cases, Latinos were channeled down in 5 
cases, whereas whites experienced downward channeling in only 1 case. Many of these cases 
were restaurant jobs in which the tester applied for a position as server but was steered to a job 
as busboy or dishwasher. Almost all were cases in which the original position required 
extensive customer contact while the suggested position did not (e.g., salesperson to stocker). 
Sometimes, testers were guided into lower positions because their resumes indicated limited 
work experience, but racial differences in channeling suggest insufficient work experience was 
more penalizing for minorities than whites. The one case of downward channeling among 
white applicants involved a tester presenting a criminal background.  
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Table 1. Job Channeling by Race
(a) 
        
  original job title  suggested job   
       
  Blacks channeled down      
 Server  Busser       
 Counter  person  Dishwasher/porter     
 Server  Busboy       
  Assistant manager  Entry fast food position     
 Server  Busboy/runner     
  Retail sales  Maintenance    
 Counter  person  Delivery       
 Sales  Stockboy       
 Sales  Not  specified
(b)    
        
  Latinos channeled down      
 Server  Runner       
  Sales  Stock       
  Steam cleaning  Exterminator    
 Counter  person  Delivery     
  Sales  Stock person    
        
  Whites channeled down      
 Server  Busboy       
        
        
  Latinos channeled up      
  Carwash attendant  Manager      
  Warehouse worker  Computer/office                 
              
  Whites channeled up      
  Line Cook  Waistaff      
  Mover  Office / Telesales    
 Dishwasher  Waistaff       
  Driver  Auto detailing    
  Kitchen job  “Front of the house” job    
  Receptionist  Company supervisor    
              
                  (a) This table includes all cases of channeling, except when all testers on a team were channeled similarly. 
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In fact, whites were more often channeled up than down. In at least six cases, white testers 
were encouraged to apply for jobs that were of a higher-level or required more customer 
contact than the initial position they inquired about. In one case, the white tester was even 
encouraged to apply for a supervisory position, despite limited work experience. Kevin reports: 
“[The employer] then asked me if I had any experience in construction. I told him I did not. He 
asked if I would be okay working with people that have thick accents like his. I told him that 
was fine. He then told me that he wanted me to be his new company supervisor.” 
Employers thus appear to have strong views about what kind of person is appropriate 
for what kind of job, either based on their own assumptions of worker competence, or 
assumptions about what their clients expect/prefer in the appearance of those serving them. 
Consistent with the testers’ field notes, employers appear to apply more stringent hiring criteria 
to minority workers, preferring whites for jobs requiring greater skill or responsibility. In 
addition, minorities are disproportionately channeled out of customer service positions, 
consistent with other research in which employers view minority applicants as lacking 
communication skills or as otherwise discomfiting for customers.  Though our testers presented 
highly effective styles of interpersonal communication, the cursory review process for these 
jobs often seemed to leave group membership more salient than any individuating 
characteristics.  In addition to whether or not the tester gets the job then, the type of job also 
reveals a racialization of employment decisions.  
The three types of differential treatment we observe illustrate how employers enact their 
racial preferences in the hiring process.  We see little evidence of outward hostility or racial 
animus in these interactions, but rather more subtle forms of discouragement or rejection.  At 
multiple points in the hiring process, black (minority) applicants face additional hurdles or   35
barriers that reduce their chances of employment and affect the quality of jobs for which they 
are considered.  The processes identified in the preceding discussion are schematically 
illustrated in Figure 3.  At each of the three decision points, we see pathways deflected by 
various forms of racial bias.  Subtle differences in employers’ responses—often imperceptible 
to the applicants themselves—together produce a pattern of outcomes systematically affected 











Complementing the quantitative indictors of differential treatment, these qualitative 
observations provide a rare window into the processes by which discrimination occurs.  The 
three categories of differential treatment observed in these data point to the range of 
experiences that constitute discrimination in the employment process.
15  In a small number of 
cases, minority testers were disqualified early on in decisions that appear to reflect fairly rigid 
                                                 
15  To be sure, our study captures only a few of the many pathways in the employment process potentially affected 
by racial bias.  Beyond our window of observation, the pathways of this diagram would presumably continue 
along later points in the employment process, including wage setting decisions, training opportunities, promotion, 
and termination decisions. This research represents one incremental contribution to understanding—and 
documenting—how race matters in contemporary low-wage labor markets.     36
preferences of employers. These instances of categorical exclusion represent one of the most 
extreme forms of discrimination, wherein minority applicants have little opportunity to 
overcome employers’ potential concerns.  By contrast, a larger number of interactions suggest 
a more complicated set of negotiations at play.  In evaluating applicant qualifications, minority 
applicants, and black men in particular, appear to be held to a higher standard than their white 
counterparts, disqualified more readily or hired more reluctantly than their white partners with 
identical skills and experience.  Further, racialized assessments of applicant quality and “fit” 
affect not only the decision to hire, but also decisions about job placement, with minority 
applicants more often channeled into positions involving less skill and/or less customer contact 
than otherwise similar whites.  Together, these experiences illustrate how racial disadvantage is 
dynamically constructed and reinforced, with the assessment of applicant qualifications and 
suitability subject to interpretation and bias. While not an exhaustive catalogue of 
discrimination experiences, the fact that these dynamics are observed in naturalistic settings 
(with little prompting) attests to their relative frequency and regularity.  Together, these 
experiences help to reveal how race shapes employers’ evaluations in subtle but systematic 
ways, with important implications for structuring opportunity along racial lines.  
 
Discussion 
Sending trained testers with equivalent resumes to apply for entry-level jobs revealed clear 
evidence of discrimination among low-wage employers in New York City. Blacks were only 
half as likely to receive a callback or job offer relative to equally qualified whites; moreover 
black and Latino applicants with clean backgrounds fared no better than a white applicant just 
released from prison.  The magnitude of these racial disparities provides vivid evidence of the   37
continuing significance of race in contemporary low-wage labor markets, with a racial 
hierarchy among young men favoring whites, then Latinos, and blacks as the candidates of last 
resort.  
  The episodes of discrimination recorded in this study were seldom characterized by 
overt racism or hostility.  In fact, our testers rarely perceived any signs of clear prejudice.  
Instead, side by side comparisons of our testers’ experiences reveals a pattern of subtle but 
consistent differential treatment. Minority applicants were disqualified more readily or hired 
more reluctantly than their white partners with identical skills and experience.  Additionally, 
black and Latino applicants were routinely channeled into positions requiring less customer 
contact and more manual work than their white counterparts.  Where we observe interactions 
between applicants and employers, we see a small number of cases that reflect seemingly rigid 
racial preferences on the part of employees. More often, differential treatment emerged in the 
social interaction of the job interview.   Employers appeared to see more potential in the stated 
qualifications of white applicants, and more commonly viewed white applicants as a better fit 
for more desirable jobs. 
 The findings of discrimination presented here are particularly striking because the 
testers in this study represented a best-case scenario for low-wage job seekers.  The testers 
were college-educated young men with effective styles of self-presentation.  Though posing as 
high school graduates with more limited skills, these young men stood well above the typical 
applicant for these low-wage jobs.  The effects of race among individuals with fewer hard and 
soft skill advantages may well be larger than those estimated here.   
At the same time, while we find robust evidence of racial discrimination, we should be 
careful not to interpret these results as showing the level of discrimination actively experienced   38
by minority job seekers in the New York labor market. Our sampling design, based on 
employers not workers, over-represents small firms relative to their share of employment, thus 
including many restaurants and independent retailers for whom hiring is less bureaucratic, and 
who lack the human resource departments that manage the equal employment opportunity 
obligations of large firms (Dobbin et al. 1993).  Nevertheless, our sampled employers well 
represent the kinds of low-skill service work that dominates low-wage urban labor markets.  
A second limitation on the generalizability of our findings results from our sampling 
procedures based on classified advertisements.  Surveys of job seekers suggest that 25 to 30 
percent of non-college jobs are filled by classified ads, with the remainder filled through some 
combination of network referrals, walk-in applications, and employment agencies (Holzer, 
1987).  These search strategies may generate a different distribution of employers from that 
reported here.  Some argue that the focus on jobs advertised through metropolitan newspapers 
understates the extent of discrimination.  Firms who wish to discriminate, it is argued, are more 
likely to advertise job openings through more restrictive channels, such as through the 
networks of existing employees, employment agencies, or more selective publications (Fix & 
Struyk 1993:32; Petersen et al. 2000; Elliott 2000).  Others, by contrast, argue that any random 
sample of employers will overstate the extent of discrimination actually experienced by job 
seekers.  If black applicants can identify and avoid firms that discriminate, the actual incidence 
of labor market discrimination will be correspondingly reduced (Becker, 1957; Heckman, 
1998).  Of course, the ability of minority workers to avoid the effects of discrimination by self-
selecting into non-discriminatory firms requires that a sufficient number of non-discriminatory 
employers exist; that there are no differences in the quality of jobs offered by employers who 
do and do not discriminate; and that the search costs necessary to locate non-discriminatory   39
employers are trivial.  Future research using microdata to track the search patterns and 
outcomes of black and white job seekers would provide better leverage on this question.  From 
our data, we can more safely conclude that job searches across a wide range of employers 
represented by the classified ads of five New York newspapers reveal substantial 
discrimination.  Understanding how job seekers adapt to this reality remains a challenge for 
future research.    
The findings for the New York City labor market reported here add to evidence of 
racial discrimination in employment reported from recent field experiments in Milwaukee, 
Boston, and Chicago (Pager, 2003; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004). By contrast, the 
significant evidence of discrimination found in these studies contrasts sharply with recent 
survey research showing small racial differences in wages (Farkas and Vicknair 1996; Neal 
and Johnson 1996).  How might these disparate findings be reconciled?   First, as noted above, 
the presence of discrimination in the labor market may lead workers to differentially sort 
across employers, such that minority job seekers queue for jobs offered by employers less 
likely to discriminate.  These dynamics can lead to longer search or wait times for minority job 
seekers, even if not reflected in ultimate wage offers. Indeed, data from the late 1990s show 
that the unemployment spells of black men (3.1 months) are about twice as long as for whites 
(1.6 months) (Gottschalck 2003, 2), suggesting that the primary effects of discrimination on 
labor market outcomes may be reflected in employment differentials rather than wages.
16   
                                                 
16  Johnson & Neal (1998), for example, find that, after controlling for cognitive ability and other human capital 
characteristics, black-white differences in employment among young men remain large and statistically 
significant. The importance of employment over wages for racial inequality in economic status is likely to be 
especially great for young noncollege men, for whom the overall level of wage dispersion is low. Later in the life 
course, as wage dispersion increases and labor force experience cumulates, the racial wage gap becomes more 
pronounced (e.g., Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2005).  For a historical example, see Whatley (1990), who shows that   40
Second, the experience of discrimination may further add to the psychic costs of the job 
search process, prompting some to opt out altogether.  If discrimination discourages all but the 
most motivated and most able black job seekers, black wage earners would represent an 
increasingly select group. Through the 1990s, increasing numbers of young black men dropped 
out of the formal labor market, contributing to an artificial convergence of black and white 
wages (Western & Pettit, 2005).  Without effectively accounting for the processes that precede 
labor force participation—including discrimination—wage estimates can account for only one 
incomplete picture of the larger employment process.  
Our findings add to a large research program demonstrating the continuing contribution 
of discrimination to racial inequality in the post-civil rights era. Still, significant questions 
remain unanswered. The audit experiment necessarily focuses on the hiring behavior of 
employers but does not examine the skills, preferences, and networks of job seekers. We do not 
know, and few research designs have been devised to test, the relative magnitude of the effects 
of discrimination compared to the effects of the human and social capital. Such an analysis 
would need to study both employers as they screen job applicants, and workers as they search 
for jobs. 
The effects of discrimination, relative to human and social capital, should also be 
defined broadly. As evidence of discrimination in the post civil-rights era has accumulated, 
new research should go beyond determining whether discrimination is present to consider how 
the effects of discrimination unfold over the life cycle and across social space. Episodes of 
discrimination may not only cause unemployment at a point in time, but have long-term 
                                                                                                                                                          
despite the substantial racial barriers to employment that existed among Northern firms after World War I, blacks 
and whites experienced remarkably similar wage rates.    41
effects, weakening the attachment of minority workers to the labor market and reducing labor 
force participation. Discrimination may produce broader cultural effects in which work itself is 
de-legitimated as a fair source of opportunity.  The effects of discrimination may also vary 
across the population, concentrating perhaps among the young men whose employment rates 
are lowest.  Tracing these larger and more varied effects of discrimination show both the 
advantages and limits of the experimental method used here. The experiment allows us to infer 
discrimination with great certainty, but the effects of discrimination are narrowly defined. The 
broader effects of discrimination – on the cultural dimensions of economic life and over the life 
course – are harder to pinpoint but may indicate more fundamental and intractable inequalities. 
Such a research agenda that includes these wider consequences is less skeptical that 
discrimination exists and more curious about its continuing effects on not just on employment 
inequality, but on American race relations more broadly.   42
Appendix A. Robustness Checks 
 
We examine the robustness of our primary results by examining racial and ethnic contrasts for 
different subsets of the data (Table A1). Though small numbers in certain cells lead to some 
instability in estimates, these breakdowns can help to examine the consistency of effects across 
the full range of the sample.  To account for learning or adaptation by the testers we estimate 
effects for the first and second halves of the experimental period. In each period, whites and 
Latinos receive significantly more positive responses than blacks, and whites receive slightly 
more positive responses than Latinos. To examine whether our results depend strongly on any 
particular area within New York, we separate the experimental effects by location. Over half 
the audited employers were located in Manhattan. The pattern of black disadvantage was found 
throughout Manhattan and in the outer boroughs. To examine whether the tester first sent to an 
employer was more likely to be successful, the order in which testers were sent was 
randomized. Experimental effects are similar regardless of which tester interviewed first. 
Finally, we compare the outcomes of audits in which testers had little or no interaction with the 
employer to those characterized by more substantial personal contact.  Here we see some 
evidence that personal contact reduces racial disparities in employment, consistent with the 
notion that individualizing information can help to offset the effects of negative stereotypes.   
The bottom half of the table presents these same comparisons for the team in which the 
white applicants present evidence of a felony conviction. Across these comparisons we find 
treatment effects close to zero, supporting the finding that employers did not distinguish 
strongly between whites with criminal records and minority job seekers without.  In short, 
these results indicate a large racial preference among New York employers for white job 
applicants over black applicants, smaller preference for whites over Latinos and Latinos over 
blacks; and little difference between white felons and minorities with clean backgrounds. All 
these results are robust to tester effects, experimental effects, and appear to be roughly uniform 
across New York City.  
 
Table A1. Percentage of positive responses and race differences, by date, employer address, and race of first tester 
 
White Latino Black  Race  Differences
a 
Subsample (N)  (W)  (L)  (B)  W/L  W/B  L/B 
               
Total  (171)  31 25.1 15.2  1.2 (0.02)  2 (0.00)  1.7 (0.00) 
               
Date
b               
Feb 23 - Apr 7 (84)  29.8  23.8  9.5  1.3  (0.08)  3.1  (0.00)  2.5  (0.00) 
Apr 8 - Jul 16 (84)  33.3  27.4  21.4  1.2  (0.04)  1.6  (0.00)  1.3  (0.05) 
               
Location
c               
Below 34th St. (56)  23.2  21.4  12.5  1.1  (0.31)  1.9  (0.00)  1.7  (0.03) 
34
th St. - 72nd St. (46)  30.4  21.7  17.4  1.4  (0.02)  1.8  (0.00)  1.3  (0.15) 
Above 72nd St. (18)  33.3  22.2  5.6  1.5  (0.00)  6  (0.00)  4  (0.00) 
Other  (50)  40  34  20  1.2 (0.12)  2 (0.00)  1.7 (0.00)   43
               
Race of first tester               
White  (68)  27.9 23.5 10.3  1.2 (0.11)  2.7 (0.00)  2.3 (0.00) 
Black  (45)  40 31.1  20  1.3 (0.06)  2 (0.00)  1.6 (0.01) 
Latino  (53)  28.3 22.6 18.9  1.3 (0.09)  1.5 (0.00)  1.2 (0.15) 
               
Type of positive response
d               
Callback  (171)  12.9 9.9 2.9  1.3  (0.10) 4.4  (0.00) 3.4  (0.00) 
Job offer (171)  21.1  17  12.9  1.2  (0.02)  1.6  (0.00)  1.3  (0.02) 
               
Personal Contact
e               
   No personal contact (46)
f  10.9  6.5  0  1.7  (0.09) -  - -  - 




Latino Black  Race  Differences
a 
Subsample (N)  (Wf)  (L)  (B)  Wf/L  Wf/B  L/B 
               
Total  (169)  17.2 15.4  13  1.1 (0.25)  1.3 (0.08)  1.2 (0.17) 
               
Date
b               
Mar 2 - Apr 13 (83)  16.9  13.3  10.8  1.3  (0.16)  1.6  (0.06)  1.2  (0.21) 
Apr 14 - Aug 6 (82)  17.1  17.1  15.9  1  (0.43)  1.1  (0.35)  1.1  (0.34) 
               
Location
c               
Below 34th St. (51)  9.8  7.8  3.9  1.3  (0.30)  2.5  (0.05)  2  (0.00) 
34th St. - 72nd St. (46)  13  17.4  13  0.8  (0.74)  1  (0.42)  1.3  (0.14) 
Above 72nd St. (7)  0  0  0  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Other  (62)  29  21  21  1.4 (0.08)  1.4 (0.09)  1 (0.46) 
               
Race of first tester               
White  (53)  20.8 18.9 13.2  1.1 (0.34)  1.6 (0.13)  1.4 (0.15) 
Black  (59)  18.6 15.3 15.3  1.2 (0.20)  1.2 (0.15)  1 (0.39) 
Latino  (52)  11.5 11.5 11.5  1 (0.44)  1 (0.42)  1 (0.41) 
               
Type of positive response
d               
Callback  (169)  11.2 9.5 5.3  1.2  (0.23) 2.1  (0.01) 1.8  (0.02) 
Job  offer  (169)  5.9 6.5 7.7  0.9  (0.58) 0.8  (0.77) 0.8  (0.65) 
               
   Personal Contact
e               
      No personal contact (75)
f  8 8 4  1  (0.45) 2  (0.09) 2  (0.04) 
   Personal contact (39)  35.9  28.2  30.8  1.3  (0.12)  1.2  (0.24)  0.9  (0.58) 
                44
aNumbers in parentheses are bootstrap p-values for a one-sided test of whether the ratio is less than or equal to one. 
b Changes over time capture several possible effects: learning or adaptation by testers, compositional changes in the types of 
employers brought into the sample at different points, and changes in the business cycle. 
c Street addresses are for Manhattan. 
d Because some testers received both a job offer and a subsequent callback, the sum of these two columns may be greater than 
the total listed above (in which a positive response is calculated by the presence of a callback or job offer)  
e Analyses of “personal contact” include only those cases in which all tester partners experienced personal contact; those in the “no 
personal contact” analyses include those cases in which none of the tester partners experienced personal contact. This exclusion 
avoids any confounding effect of employers’ racial preferences as reflected in the decision to interview.   
f Because the response rate for blacks in this subsample is zero, ratios in which blacks are in the denominator are undefined.  For 
the purposes of this analysis, we represent this ratio as greater than the value of the numerator over one. 
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Appendix B. Results by Tester Teams 
 
In the course of fielding two three-person teams of testers we used ten different testers: two 
Latinos, four African Americans, and four whites.  In each three-person team consisting of a 
white, black, and Latino, the ten testers were combined into 6 different unique combinations.  
Before pooling the data across combinations of testers, Heckman and Seigelman (1993) 
recommend testing for the homogeneity of responses across combinations.  The columns below 
represent mutually exclusive outcomes; overall response rates by race can be calculated by 
summing all columns in which a given race group is represented.  A chi-square test within each 
team fails to reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity across combinations.  With this 
evidence of homogeneity, we report treatment effects pooled across testers.  Table B reports 
the detailed experimental results for each unique combination of testers.  
 
Table B. Detailed Experimental Results, by Unique Combination of Testers
a 
   Who Gets a Positive Response (%):      
Group  All  None  W + L  W + B  L + B  W  L  B  N 
White without criminal record (Posterior predictive probability of χ2 statistic: 0.054)
b 
1 11 69.2 4.4  3.3  0  7.7  4.4  0  91 
2 7.5  67.9  11.3  0  0  9.4 3.8  0  53 
3 36.4  18.2  0  0  0  18.2 18.2  9.1  11 
4 33.3  33.3 33.3  0  0  0  0  0  6 
5 28.6  57.1 14.3  0  0  0  0  0  7 
6 0  66.7 0  0 0  33.3 0  0  3 
Total 12.9  63.7  7.6  1.8  0  8.8  4.7  0.6  171 
White with criminal record (Posterior predictive probability of χ2 statistic: 0.588) 
1 3.7  75.3 2.5  2.5 1.2  7.4 4.9  2.5  81 
2 4.9  56.1 2.4  2.4 7.3  14.6 7.3  4.9  41 
3 2.8  77.8 8.3  2.8 2.8  2.8  0  2.8  36 
4 0  60 0  0  20  0  20  0  5 
5 0  75 0  0 0  0 0  25  4 
6 0 100 0  0 0  0 0  0  2 
Total 3.6  71 3.6  2.4 3.6  7.7 4.7  3.6  169 
               
Note: W = white; L = Latino; B = black 
aColumns of “Who Gets a Positive Response” represent mutually exclusive categories (i.e., rows sum to 100%).  
Note that in the first experiment (no criminal record), there was only a single case (group 3) in which a black 
tester received a callback when neither of his test partners received one.  
bThe chi-square test is undefined with marginal counts of zero. We calculate a posterior predictive p-value by 
simulating counts under independence for nonzero cells. 
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